some people having more wealth and income, some less. At any given time, in some societies average wealth is greater than in others. Across time, we can observe societies becoming richer or poorer and showing more or less equal distributions of wealth among their members. Does it matter from an ethical standpoint whether some people have more income and wealth than others? Does securing a more equal distribution of income and wealth either constitute the achievement of something that is intrinsically morally desirable or serve as a reliable means to the achievement of some intrinsic moral value? If we suppose that justice demands equalizing the income of wealth of persons in many circumstances, what principles of justice generate this demand?
Some philosophers and social critics have made confident pronouncements in response to these questions. Writing about the distribution of money and commodities in contemporary democracies, political theorist Michael Walzer observes that insufficient income excludes a citizen from full membership in society, but the norm of democratic equality requires that all citizens should enjoy the same full membership, so by one means or another all citizens must be assured a sufficient level of money. Moreover, there are some things that money should not be able to buy: in any society, the social meanings of particular goods rule out their exchange by sale. Votes should not be tradeable, nor the obligation to perform military service, and there are more controversial prohibited or strictly regulated exchanges. If the assurance of sufficient income and wealth guarantees full membership to all citizens, and if only those goods are for sale that should be for sale according to our shared values, then according to Walzer, " there is no such thing as a maldistribution of consumer goods. It just doesn't matter, from the standpoint of complex equality, that you have a yacht and I don't, or that the sound system of her hi-fi is greatly superior to his, or that we buy our rugs from Sears Roebuck and they get theirs from the Orient. People will focus on such matters, or not: that is a question of culture, not of distributive justice." 1 This attractive sounding position comprises three claims: (1) regarding the distribution of income and wealth, what matters morally is that everyone should have enough, (2) a person has enough when poverty does not block her from being a full member of democratic society, and (3) provided everyone has enough, that some people have more income and wealth than others violates no fundamental principle of justice and morality. 2 According to this doctrine, the fact that some are better off financially than others is a social justice concern only if such inequality has the effect of increasing or decreasing the number of people below the line of sufficiency (the number who do not have enough). Inequality in and of itself is not undesirable from the standpoint of justice.
For that matter, that people are exactly as well off financially as others is deemed desirable or not from the standpoint of justice depending on the effects of this equality on the numbers of people who reach the sufficiency line. Walzer's position is a version of sufficientarianism, the principle that the distribution of resources in society is just if and only if everyone has enough. As so far stated, the sufficientarian principle does not resolve the question, whether or not the distributions of income and wealth are in and of themselves morally significant. The issue turns on how sufficiency is understood. The good enough level might be defined in noncomparative terms, in which case whether any given individual has more or less than others is not intrinsically morally significant.
For example, it might be held that the good enough level is the level that enables a person to attain a stipulated amount of pleasure or degree of life plan fulfillment over the course of her life. The good enough level might instead be defined in comparative terms. For example, it might be stipulated that everyone has enough income and wealth when nobody has less than some fraction of the average level. This essay focuses on noncomparative versions of the sufficiency doctrine. My reason for doing so is that these versions are more interesting and plausible than their comparative counterparts.
Sufficientarianism attracts distinguished advocates. Philosopher Harry Frankfurt has argued forcefully for components of this doctrine. 3 Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson defends a democratic equality conception of justice that develops Walzer's version of the doctrine. 4 Philosopher Martha Nussbaum identifies the level of sufficiency with a good enough level of positive freedom. The person who has enough possesses the capability to function at an acceptable level in all of the ways that are individually necessary and together sufficient for a decent quality of human life. 5 In a rough and ready way, the sufficientarian approach conforms to the antipoverty focus of modern governmental welfare policies. On their face, the aim of these policies tends to be to define a minimal acceptable standard of living and to prevent people from falling below this standard rather than to make the worst off as well off as possible or anything of the sort. 6 In recent years these welfare state policies have attracted criticism, and some governments have reduced their commitment to them. But the criticism for the most part challenges the efficacy of these policies, not their normative rationale. 7 To the extent that welfare state policies (and their replacements directed to the same goal) implement most voters' values regarding the amelioration of poverty, we might suspect that the common sense moral views of most people are congruent with sufficientarianism.
In this essay I shall argue against the Walzerian version of sufficientarianism and also against the more general doctrine. These principles fail to provide a morally sound way of determining when justice requires forced transfers from more wealthy to less wealthy persons. I also suggest a more promising approach to the justice of transfers. taxed to be redistributed to others, those who are subject to the tax may opt for more leisure and less productive employment, or they may seek to engage in incomeproducing activities beyond the reach of the tax collector. In the nineteenth century the social critic John Stuart Mill observed that in calculating the overall benefit that accrues to the recipient of transfers we should distinguish "the consequences of the assistance itself, and the consequences of relying on the assistance." 9 The latter he deemed bad, often so bad as to bring about a net loss. Reliance on assistance he supposed to be undesirable because it inhibits the useful motive of self-help. One might imagine the we could secure for her, the greater the moral value of getting a given gain in well-being for her. Third, the more one is reasonably held responsible for one's present plight by virtue of the contribution of one's voluntary choices and conduct in producing it, the less the moral value of securing a given gain in well-being (if one is being proposed as a recipient of transfer) or the greater the moral disvalue of bringing about a loss in one's current well-being prospects (if one is being proposed as a source of resources to be transferred to others). Just institutions and social practices and actions are those that maximize the moral value of consequences as measured by a scale that integrates the three factors of well-being gain, prior lifetime well-being expectation, and responsibility.
This view, that accords priority to gaining benefits for the worse off and those not responsible for being worse off, is called the priority view.
To embrace this simple view of just transfers one must embrace the idea that the fact that one could act in a way that would create a benefit (avoid a loss) for another person is a reason to do it. The worse off in terms of lifetime well-being the person is, the stronger the reason to help now. Also, the strength of the reason to help can be amplified or dampened by the degree to which the person's present plight, if bad, came about as a result of fate dealing her a bad hand rather than as a result of her negligent playing of the cards that fate has dealt her.
The simple view just adumbrated excludes many factors that might be thought to shape the moral principles that determine under what circumstances transfers are just.
At the level of principle (though perhaps not at the level of practical policy), priority rules out the possibility that morality permits or requires giving special weight to the goal of ameliorating the life conditions of disadvantaged people who are fellow members of one's nation state or political community. My moral claim that someone owes me a just transfer is not strengthened just because the person happens to be a fellow citizen or community member rather than a distant stranger. Ronald Dworkin writes, "No government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those citizens over whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance." 10 On this view the legitimate government need not extend equal concern past national borders.
The simple view I espouse rejects this moral judgment.
The sufficiency doctrine, the proposal that distributive justice requires that everyone has enough, can be interpreted either as a cosmopolitan or as a communitycentered doctrine. That is to say, the doctrine might assert (1) Harry Frankfurt points out that philosophers arguing for the moral importance of equality express themselves in ways that strongly suggest that concern about inequality is not what really elicits the concern they voice. 12 Call this the "argument from egalitarian confusion." Egalitarians urge that significant inequality is bad by pointing to situations in which there is a large gap between the condition of well to do people and poor people and the poor face grim prospects, lead lives that are horrible or lacking in significant sources of satisfaction. Frankfurt correctly notes that examples of this sort do not really force the judgment that inequality per se is bad. In responding to the examples as described we should note the possibility that we are appalled above all by the grim badness of the lives that these poor people lead. But this grimness does not necessarily attach to the fate in which one gets the short end of the stick (is worse off than others). There are sticks and sticks, and some are much longer than others, so the short end may be not bad. If it were simply the gap in economic circumstances or wellbeing between poor and well-off people that troubled us, then we should be equally troubled by a similar gap between the conditions of the rich and the super-rich. But we are not; nor should we be. The suggested conclusion is that what is morally objectionable is not that some people's condition is less good than the condition of others but rather that some people face grim life conditions that fall below any reasonable threshold of a decent quality of life.
With respect to inequalities in the wealth and income that different persons have, the idea would be that it is not morally problematic that some have more and others less.
What is morally problematic is that some people have less income and wealth than they need to meet the standard of sufficiency. condition is not important to the person. In other words, being contented with one's economic circumstances means "that he does not resent his circumstances, that he is not anxious or determined to improve them, and that he does not go out of his way or take any significant initiatives to make them better." 13 To this account we should add the qualifier that what counts is that the person would be reasonable to have the attitude toward his economic circumstances just described. We do not want the requirements of distributive justice as provision of sufficiency to vary depending on people's whims or overweening ambitions, so that if one desperately wants the moon and the stars, one does not have "enough" without them.
14 Tying the notion of the good enough level of income and wealth to the attitudes it would be reasonable for a person to adopt toward her circumstances brings it about that the notion of the good enough level entirely floats away from the idea of sufficiency invoked by the argument from egalitarian confusion. That argument implicitly identifies the sufficient level for a person with the level of a minimally but acceptably decent quality of life. But one might have far above that level by anyone's lights yet still reasonably be desperately anxious to improve one's circumstances and be taking aggressive steps to secure improvements. By itself, this difficulty might not be daunting. Perhaps the best articulation of the sufficiency ideal requires abandonment of the argument from egalitarian confusion. But setting that argument to the side, we still find that the Frankfurt strategy taken on its own terms is implausible.
Notice first that a person who correctly anticipates that her life conditions will be impoverished and grim might reasonably work to adopt a Stoic attitude of indifference to the prospect that she will fail to enjoy many important components of a good life and that she will fail to command those normally important means to the good life, adequate income and wealth. She trains herself not to care about such matters. Suppose she is successful. Then the person will be content with the paltry income and wealth she has and will find nothing unsatisfying or distressing about how her life is going, even though in objective terms, the life is gruesome. We are supposing that the development of these attitudes is part of the person's best strategy of response toward her life conditions and that the attitudes she develops are in that sense reasonable.
13
There is another problem with the suggestion under review. A person at the high end, facing terrific life prospects, which include immensely favorable economic circumstances, might reasonably develop very ambitious life goals, which require for their fulfillment piles and piles of money in addition the immense stock of money he now enjoys. Let's call this person "Bill Gates." He might be the richest man in the world.
Contemplating his economic circumstances, Bill is immensely actively interested in gaining immensely more money, and reasonably so. He needs that extra cash in order to fulfill his very ambitious life goals. Recall that these goals, while ambitious, are not unreasonably so. Indeed, developing an immense focussed strong concern for bettering his economic circumstances and regarding that concern as important to his life may be the most effective means available to him to give him the best chance of achieving his rational life plan. Frankfurt's construal of what it is for a person to have enough money then yields the conclusion for this sort of case, that the richest man in the world might not have enough.
The problem is that the subjective attitude toward getting more money for herself that it is reasonable for a person to develop in view of her total circumstances does not help to identify a notion of having enough that would be a useful tool for a theory of distributive justice. We evidently need to take another tack. There is yet another difficulty that afflicts the Frankfurt proposal. Frankfurt supposes it can be reasonable to be content with one's life, where this includes not being disposed to take steps to make it better even though one sees it can be improved.
This supposition is aligned with Michael Slote's claim that rationality can consist in satisficing, not optimizing. 15 One satisfices by taking steps that will produce a satisfactory outcome, where a satisfactory outcome need not be the best outcome that is reachable. Facing a sequence of offers to purchase a car one wants to sell, one might adopt the strategy of deciding on a satisfactory sale price and accepting the first offer that meets the chosen target.
Slote associates the idea of satisficing with the different idea of moderation.
Satisficing is a strategy of choice; moderation as Slote explains it seems to be a matter of having modest appetites. 16 Slote's moderate individual seeks and accepts what is less than the best for herself that she could get. Having had one snack, she rejects a second, even though taking it would render her better off, because she is content with less than the best attainable. Setting aside choices that put the agent's own interests in conflict with the interests of other agents, Slote supposes that it is rational to be moderate and rational to be a satisficer not an optimizer.
Since taking steps to improve one's condition typically involves costs to the agent, including the cost of calculating the costs and benefits of further actions one might take, and since many choices one might take to improve one's condition are risky or uncertain, and carry a (possibly unknown) chance that the outcome will render one's condition worse, satisficing can in fact be an optimizing strategy for agents with finite information-gathering and choice-making capacity who face choices whose outcomes are risky or uncertain. Seeking a choice with a satisfactory expected outcome and not holding out for a better than satisfactory outcome are optimizing when the expected costs of seeking a better than satisfactory outcome outweigh the expected benefits. So to focus the issue whether it can be rational for an agent to satisfice, and seek a satisfactory outcome, rather than optimize, and seek the best outcome reachable, we should focus on decision problems in which the imperatives of satisfice and optimize clearly yield different directives. Suppose an agent is choosing among life plans, and there is nothing that relevantly distinguishes plan A and plan B except that plan A will yield a superior outcome. We suppose the agent knows this fact about A and B. If both A and B yield outcomes for certain that are above the satisfactory level, the Slote position is that a fully rational person might select B rather than A, on the ground that B, though inferior, is good enough. In the same vein Frankfurt would say that an agent whose life course is following B but who knows that she could costlessly switch to A and reach a better outcome for certain can be reasonable to be content with B and not switch course on the ground that B is good enough. Let us go back to the task of finding a criterion that will enable us to tell when a person's life is going well enough on the whole. We need a way of picking one level of quality of life as the good enough level.
V. SUFFICIENCY AND TRIAGE
The sufficientarian principle of justice says that institutions and practices should be arranged and actions chosen so that of those people who will ever live, as many as possible reach the sufficient level. This formulation leaves it open how to define the sufficient or good enough level.
In defining sufficiency, my bias is to employ an objective well-being standard.
Such a standard measures how well off or badly off someone is, for purposes of determining whether he attains the good enough level, according to the objective wellbeing or welfare level that she reaches (or perhaps: is enabled to reach). If instead we opt for a standard of subjective well-being or of something that has nothing to do with I do not claim to have shown that sufficientarianism as described, applied to the battlefield scenario, is the morally preferred policy. I merely want to sketch a context in which sufficientarianism has some prima facie plausibility and does not seem obviously counterintuitive. In my view, the underlying reason that the battle field triage scenario fills this bill is that saving a life is arguably far more important morally than alleviating suffering for a few days or helping to make the death of those who are dying more comfortable. The difference between dying in the aftermath of battle and being enabled to emerge alive from one's wounds for the foreseeable future also seems far more significant than the difference between living but losing a limb and living and retaining the threatened injured limb. At the limit, if we regarded all possible outcomes for potential patients of receiving greater or lesser medical treatment as insignificant except the outcome in which a person whose life is threatened is saved from death, we would unequivocally embrace the sufficientarian principle in this application as we have interpreted it.
If we think that, for example, alleviating the pain experienced by people in their dying hours is utterly insignificant compared to the saving of a life, then we should not channel medical resources to alleviate the deathbed hours even of an infinite number of potential patients if this outcome must be purchased at the cost of leaving one person to die who could be saved. If we think that anything we might achieve by expenditure of medical resources pales into insignificance in just that way in comparison with the value of saving a life, then the triage policy, use medical resources so as to maximize the number of lives saved, makes perfect sense.
I do not think that in any actual battlefield triage scenario, the possible utility gains would shape up as I have characterized a hypothetical case. What one should notice is that in the special imagined circumstances in which sufficientarianism would be a plausible and arguably correct policy, it yields the same recommendations as other views. Utilitarianism (along with variants of utilitarianism that give extra weight to securing utility gains and avoiding utility losses to those who are worse off but not the infinite weight that the maximin utility function accords) would chime in with the same verdict supporting the triage policy as described. Hence the battlefield example is not a good example to focus our thoughts as to whether sufficientarianism is a superior morality to these other views. In the example many views converge in their implications;
to adjudicate among the views we need to examine examples in which the different principles would yield different implications concerning what we should do.
If we relax the very special factual assumptions that we packed into the characterization of the battlefield example, we find that suficientarianism loses its aura of plausibility. We can do this by making the battlefield example more realistic. It is not in fact true that saving a life is of transcendent importance compared to any other goal that we might achieve with scarce medical resources and facing many patients in dire need.
In some cases, the life that we could save would be so damaged as to be barely worth living or perhaps even not worth living at all. Suppose Smith is severely injured. We can keep him alive, but he will stay in a coma for ten years and then emerge to live a short life of a few hours of intense unremediable pain and then die. Suppose Jones is on the verge of death from wounds. We can save him, but he will never recover: he will be confined to a hospital and will never again have the use of reason. Saving a life encompasses many possible outcomes that vary greatly in their moral value. Some of 20 these possible outcomes even have negative moral value. On the other side, we might at very tiny cost of resources be able to alleviate the pain of many dying patients. Surely this is a great, not an inconsequential, possible gain. Another patient will live regardless of whether she is treated or not, but if treated she will have the full use of her limbs, and if untreated she will be a cripple. It is unnecessary to multiply examples. Even in battlefield triage situations we do not see the discontinuity in utilities to be gained from various possible expenditures of resources that could render the sufficientarian principle morally compelling.
VI. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE SUFFICIENCY DOCTRINE
The idea that the first priority of justice is to bring all persons to the level of an acceptable quality of life so far as this is possible sounds attractive. The sufficiency norm seems to combine a kind of special concern for the worse off with a moderate limit on that concern. Once we have brought someone to the good enough level, what happens above that level is not the concern of justice. It might be that an acceptable quality of life requires ready access to a functioning car, but it does not matter from the standpoint of justice that I drive a Chevy and you drive a Ferrari. Moreover, the sufficiency doctrine weaves together individual responsibility with a moderately demanding conception of distributive justice. Once all are sustained above the line of sufficiency, and a fair framework of terms of interaction is established, each individual is responsible for how she chooses to live her life and for the well-being level that she gets as a result. The individual above the line of sufficiency is responsible for her life in the sense that she will bear the costs of the choices she makes and that meeting an unfortunate (but still above threshold) outcome will not trigger a justified claim for further compensation.
The rub comes in specifying the level of sufficiency in a nonarbitrary way. The relevant standard for determining when the sufficient level is reached cannot focus just on one aspect of the quality of a person's life but must somehow integrate the value of various goods that we find significant in a human life. In broad terms, we need a way of making interpersonal comparisons of utility or welfare. This is a tall order, but for present purposes let's suppose we have the theoretically best interpersonal welfare standard on hand. It is not cheating to make this assumption in the present context of argument, for I am trying to refute the sufficiency doctrine, and to clarify where this specific doctrine goes wrong, it is best to grant controversial assumptions that the doctrine shares with a great many approaches to distributive justice. If interpersonal comparisons of welfare make no sense, then the theory of distributive justice is in trouble, not just the sufficiency doctrine.
But with such a standard in hand, we find a continuum with an infinite number of gradations of well-being. (We get qualitatively the same result if we have a very large finite number of degrees of well-being.) A person's life can range from horribly gruesome to wonderfully rich in fulfillment with indefinitely many stops between these extremes. Although moralists have proposed various putatively nonarbitrary ways of slicing into the continuum and declaring some particular point the good enough level (some suggestions will be reviewed below), my claim will be that there is no reason to set the level here rather than there or any other place.
Wherever the level of sufficiency is set, the doctrine of sufficiency must face two objections. The sufficientarian norm holds that we ought to bring it about that as many But as already mentioned, if you substitute other possible differences in people's condition for the ones Walzer mentions, the idea that all such comparisons are a "don't care" from a moral standpoint begins to look worse than dubious. Given that we can't be brought to sufficiency, it doesn't matter whether you die a painful lingering death at age ten whereas I die a quick painless death at age twenty. Given that we are both above sufficiency, it doesn't matter that I suffer from chronic arthritis and die at age sixty while you stay in the pink of health until you die at the ripe old age of 100. So the sufficientarian is forced to say. But only commitment to a bad theory would incline anybody to say such things, for they are as plainly false as any moral claims ever are.
To imagine a world in which sufficientarianism would be acceptable, we must There is a stage of floundering and wobbling and then a jump to a basic competence.
But even with regard to these examples, it is far from obvious that the level of basic competence is unambiguous (suppose I can dog-paddle a little but cannot master a range of strokes; suppose I can ride on a wide level path but cannot maintain control on a narrow downhill track) and doubtful that whatever level is specified to be good enough has special ethical significance. Moreover, with many significant functionings, such as becoming educated, enjoying good health and fitness, developing friendships, it is clearly futile to try to specify a sufficient level such that achievements below the threshold and above it have far less moral value. Finally, when we evaluate a person's overall level of functioning, what matters is the appropriately weighted sum of all of her significant beings and doings. High achievements on one dimension can offset a low attainment on another, so that someone can be sustaining a very good quality of life even though one or another of her functioning (or capability, if you prefer) scores is subpar. Once again we are back to the idea of comprehensive welfare or well-being, which admits of indefinitely many gradations, none of which has any particular claim to be deemed the all-important threshold of sufficiency.
I have attempted to rebut the most plausible attempts in the literature to work out the notion of a "good enough" level of quality of life. 18 I have no general proof that this notion cannot be specified in a satisfactory way to fulfill its role in a sufficientarian ethic.
The doctrine of sufficiency as understood by its proponents puts enormous theoretical pressure on the notion of the "good enough." My hunch is that this pressure cannot be contained in a satisfactory way. Put another way, the hunch is that the appeal of the sufficiency doctrine dissipates as the doctrine is worked out in detail.
VIII. SUFFICIENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY
Another objection against the sufficiency doctrine by itself only suggests the need to qualify not reject it. In this sense the criticism to be adumbrated is less fundamental than those developed to this point. Still, the necessary qualification is nontrivial.
As I have been construing it, the sufficiency doctrine requires that we bring as many people of those who shall live as possible to the level of sufficiency. Being at the sufficient level is to be judged over the course of a person's entire life. The aim that is proposed is that the person's life taken as a whole should meet the sufficiency level.
There are questions raised by this formulation about how to interpret the sufficiency of a life. Suppose that an individual is far above the sufficiency level for most of her life but sinks below it for a time toward the end of her life. Do we judge that as a whole this individual did not attain sufficiency, because that requires that at each moment of her life the good enough level is maintained? Or should we say that over her life as a whole this person did attain sufficiency, because this requires that on the average the times of the person's life should be at the good enough level, and this individual's life is above sufficiency on the average? Or do we need rather to make a single holistic judgment which takes account of various factors that affect the character of the life of the individual taken as a whole but that cannot be decomposed without residue to goods that accrue at particular discrete times of the person's life? I leave these complications aside, and just suppose we have some acceptable way of assessing whether or not a person's life as a whole reaches the good enough level.
The objection based on responsibility argues that some ways in which a person's life as a whole might fail to reach sufficiency are properly ascribable to the person, as her responsibility, not the moral responsibility of society. That is to say, the moral obligations set by a reasonable theory of social justice do not require society to guarantee or do all in its power to ensure any level of welfare for any individual. The most that society is required to do is make it possible for individuals to attain the "just" level of welfare by suitable effort on their part. Assume contrary to the arguments of the previous sections that we have a compelling account of the good enough level that justice requires us to secure for as many as can be secured. Suppose that a society dedicated to achieving sufficiency for all provides me with a level of resources and education that would enable to get me to get to the good enough level if I conducted my life in a reasonably prudent way. But I do not. I squander my opportunities and am on a path that will take me to the gutter. But since the sufficientarian principle of justice imposes as a first priority that as many as possible be sustained at the good enough level, society on this view is obligated to supply me with extra resources to make up for my imprudence, at least so long as doing so does not prove to be an inefficient use of resources from the sufficientarian standpoint. But then suppose I squander these resources again, and again, and again. Perhaps there are good reasons to adopt a forgiving line on responsibility, so that we should provide people second chances and third chances and fourth chances to assemble their life into a decent shape even if they have thoroughly ruined their first, second, and third chances. But in principle the sufficientarian obligation never runs out. Society remains committed as a first priority of justice (that takes lexical priority over any other duty that might compete with it), that as many as possible be brought to have the good enough level. This goes too far. There should be a moral division of responsibility between society and the individual, that at some point permits society to say to the individual that enough has been done for him regardless of the lifetime welfare level he sustains.
There is a flip side to this responsibility objection. If the sufficiency doctrine holds that as many people as possible be sustained at the good enough threshold over the course of their lives, it follows that if we accept the doctrine, we should restrict individual liberty in self-regarding matters whenever doing so increases the numbers who are sustained at the threshold. Consider then dangerous activities that are dangerous only to their voluntary participants and that are highly valued by them. Suppose, as is likely, that those who engage in mountain climbing would not be reduced to a below threshold existence if they were prohibited from engaging in the sport. Yet some youthful participants will suffer premature death or unremediable severe disability from climbing injuries. These unlucky participants end up below the sufficiency threshold (for the purposes of considering this objection I am supposing that my previous arguments denying that a reasonable nonarbitrary sufficient level can be specified are unsuccessful). It follows that banning mountain climbing, if we can police the ban without excessive cost, will boost the number of people who are sustained at the good enough level. So we ought to proclaim and enforce such a ban, according to the sufficiency doctrine.
I am not opposed in principle to all paternalistic restriction of liberty 19 but the sufficiency doctrine goes overboard in this regard. In the example just described, the practice of mountain climbing might generate large welfare gains for those involved in it, despite the unfortunate accidents that befall a few. The sufficiency doctrine would recommend banning the activity when virtually any remotely plausible alternative ethic would reject this counsel. This is another instance of the implausibility of ignoring for all practical purposes as morally insignificant all welfare gains that can be achieved, no matter how large, no matter the numbers of people affected, when the gains lie above the line of sufficiency.
IX. A WIDER SUFFICIENCY DOCTRINE?
The discussion to this point is directed at a particular interpretation of the idea that justice requires that everyone have enough. The interpretation holds that justice accords strict lexical priority to the aim of bringing it about that as many as possible of the people who shall live reach the level of sufficiency. Perhaps the trouble lies not in the general idea of sufficiency but in the uncharitable gloss I have given it.
One possibility is to relax the stipulation that the aim of attaining sufficiency for as many as possible takes lexical priority over other justice values. One aim has lexical priority over another just in case one should refuse to sacrifice even the smallest degree of fulfillment of the first aim in order to secure any degree whatsoever of fulfillment of the second aim. Suppose we assert that attaining sufficiency is important, but does not merit strict lexical priority.
The core of my objection against sufficiency is that it demands discontinuity, a jump in our moral response, in an area where no basis for this discontinuity can be found. The assertion that the aim of sufficiency ought to get less than lexical priority should attract the objections I have already made, but to a lesser degree, depending on the strength of then priority for sufficiency asserted. At the limit, just asserting that attaining sufficiency would be nice is not a strong enough claim to be objectionable.
Another possibility avoids the objection that sufficientarianism favors a very slight improvement in one person's position that barely pushes this individual to sufficiency over any gains however large that could be obtained for people whose lives are hellishly bad, significantly improveable at modest resource cost, but unavoidably subthreshold.
This revised sufficiency doctrine says that the top priority of distributive justice is to bring about improvements in the lives of those who are below the threshold of sufficiency.
Below the threshold, priority goes to obtaining benefits for those who are worse off, whether or not they can be brought to sufficiency. This priority might be interpreted as more or less strict. The character of revised sufficiency can be indicated by considering the version of it in which priority is maximally strict. One then should always give strict lexical priority to bringing about gains or preventing losses for the worst off, up to the threshold of sufficiency. Revised sufficiency in this version may be described as "maximin with a cap." 20 Revised sufficiency consists of two elements. One is that we should give priority to bringing about gains (and preventing losses) for the worse off. The second element is that priority for the worse off is shaped by the threshold of sufficiency: Bringing about gains for those below the threshold has absolute priority over bringing about gains for those already above the threshold, and for those above the threshold, priority for the worse off ceases to obtain.
Of these two elements, only the second strikes me as objectionable. Priority for the worse off is fine. The extreme maximin version of this priority is too strict, however.
To hold as maximin insists that achieving a benefit of any size, however small, for a single worst off person takes precedence over achieving a benefit, no matter how large, for any number of next-worst-of persons, is surely excessive. But determining the appropriate strength of priority is beyond the scope of this essay.
Shaping priority by the threshold of sufficiency, however, is implausible. As I have urged, it is unacceptable to give no weight at all to benefits of any size for any number of individuals above the level deemed sufficient when those benefits can be purchased by losses no matter how small for no matter how few individuals below the threshold. For example, preventing lethal diseases that strike only above-threshold individuals could be morally more cost-effective than achieving tiny pleasures for belowthreshold individuals. Also, priority to the extent that it matters at all, does not cease altogether to matter when one has to resolve conflicts of interest among individuals who are above the threshold to different degrees.
Some of the people below the threshold of sufficiency that the revised view gives priority to aiding will be very poor transformers of resources into welfare. They can be helped, but an enormous infusion of aid resources provides them very little benefit.
Such people become basins of attraction of resources under the revised view. This defect attaches to the sufficiency doctrine, but when we move to the revised sufficiency view, the problem worsens. This is so because the revised view recommends channeling resources to poor transformers even when they cannot be brought to sufficiency, so long as further infusions of resources will produce some further gain in their condition. What is most plausible in the disparagement is the claim that everyone's having the same is not intrinsically morally desirable. A broader claim is also plausible: how well one person's life goes is fixed by the weighted sum of objective goods one attains, not by how the sum of one's goods compares to the sums of others.
But it is a long jump from these claims to the doctrine of sufficiency. In particular, the agreement with the observation that the gap between the life prospects of the hopelessly destitute and the moderately well off matters a lot more than the same-sized gap between the life prospects of the very well off and the incredibly well off does not compel agreement with the claim that nothing matters other than avoiding grim conditions of life and attaining sufficiency. We can account for the observation without countenancing the dubious notion of the "good enough" quality of life.
Consider the weighted utilitarian or prioritarian moral principle, which holds that the moral value of securing a benefit of a given size for a person or avoiding a loss of that size for a person is greater, the greater the benefit as measured by a utility or welfare scale, and greater, the lower the level of utility or welfare that the person would have reached over the course of her life in the absence of that benefit or loss prevention.
This formulation assumes that cardinal interpersonal comparisons of utility or welfare make sense, though in given circumstances they might be difficult or unfeasible. This "principle" includes a family of positions that vary depending on the relative weight that is assigned to size of benefit and prior welfare level of its recipient in calculating the moral value of benefits. Prioritarianism, as a form of act-consequentialism, holds that we ought always to maximize moral value so defined.
For the prioritarian, what matters morally when getting a benefit to a person is in the offing is not how badly off that person is by comparison to others. What matters is the degree to which the person is well off or badly off as measured on an absolute or noncomparative scale.
To see this point, consider two possible situations in which we might confer a small benefit on Smith. In each case the world contains 100 persons and Smith is worse off than any of them. The two possible worlds differ in this way: in one, Smith is very badly off, say at -100, a hellish condition. The other 99 persons all have lives worth living, above the zero point. In the second world, by contrast, while Smith is worst off, the differences in well-being between Smith and the others are minuscule. Smith is at -50.0002, for example, and the other 99 are at -50.0001. In this second case it hardly matters at all whether to enable Smith or one of the others to obtain the benefit, whereas in the first case, it is morally a big deal that the benefit should if possible be channeled to
Smith rather than to any of the others. What is morally significant in determining what we should do is the absolute well-being level of the persons we might aid or harm, not their relative positions.
Return to Frankfurt's argument from egalitarian confusion. First of all we should agree with Frankfurt that the amounts of wealth and income one has are not in and of themselves ethically important. What matters is the quality of life that one's wealth and income together with one's other circumstances enable one to attain. According to prioritarianism, it is morally more valuable to get a single unit of well-being improvement for a very badly off person than for a moderately badly off person, and it is less important to secure a comparable small benefit to a moderately well off person than to a decidedly well off person, and still less important to channel a similar benefit to an extremely well off person than to someone who is far above that level in well-being, even though in each case the inequality in well-being between the potential recipients is exactly the same. The prioritarian weighting secures this result.
To account for what is plausible in the argument from egalitarian confusion we have no need to posit the idea of a sufficient or good enough level along with the norm that the top priority of justice is to maximize the number of people who get to this good enough level. We have seen that these latter ideas turn out to be problematic when examined, so it is a welcome result that the argument does not pressure us in the slightest to embrace them.
Eschewing leximin priority rankings, the prioritarian will in practice espouse a moderate egalitarianism. By this I mean that the priority accorded to securing gains for the worse off is not absolute, but varies depending on the amount of benefit that can be secured for better off and worse off. Leximin says that we should prefer a penny's worth of benefits to the worst off at the cost of any amount no matter how great of foregone gains for no matter how many better off persons. Prioritarianism rejects this rigid and doctrinaire priority ranking.
In other respects prioritarianism is a radical morality. The choice between coercive and noncoercive means to prioritarian ends is to be made strictly according to the calculation that fixes which policy would deliver better consequences as assessed by prioritarianism in the long run. At the level of first principle there is no special moral presumption against coercion and compulsion.
Like any impartial consequentialism, prioritarianism bids us to pay no heed in principle to distance in space and time or to national boundaries or special ties such as family or friendship or community. One's obligations are the same towards distant strangers and persons who will exist in the future as to fellow members of a particular current society near at hand. It may be that it is infeasible or impossible for me to do anything that would make a difference to the lives of distant persons and possible and feasible to do a lot for those close by. If so, the prioritarian principle limits its focus to the near at hand-but only to the degree that this extreme assumption actually holds true. It may be that it is much more difficult for me to become sufficiently informed about distant people and places than about my own neighborhood so that I can form reliable views as to how to help the strangers and avoid harming them, and again, if this is really so, then judgments about how I should act toward them are to be discounted by their uncertainty.
But in principle the prioritarian moral imperative to help the needy varies in strength only with people's neediness and the costs and benefits of alternative actions, not with the strength of the special ties one has to particular persons.
A subtler issue arises once one notes that the prioritarian ought is a thin notion.
From the fact that I ought to do X it does not follow and may not be true that if I fail to do X I should be punished even merely by internal pangs of conscience. Bringing it about that punishment accrues to those who act wrongly might itself be a wrong act by prioritarian standards. The social planner implementing prioritarianism would not wish to make war against human nature by raising the practical standard of obligation so high that people are socialized to inflict punishment on violations of duties by self and others that natural selfishness strongly inclines people to perpetrate all the time. At least, the ideal social planner would not make war against human nature in this way if, as is likely, doing so makes the expectable outcome worse by the prioritarian moral standard. So from the fact that well off people morally ought to give away much of their wealth toward the amelioration of global poverty and act morally wrongly if they do not it does not immediately follow that people should be made to feel obligated to act in this way where being obligated involves being liable to punishment for noncompliance.
XI. RESPONSIBILITY-CATERING PRIORITARIANISM
One further wrinkle demands straightening.
Even if the priority view only incorporated priority to the worse off, it would still give rise to an instrumental norm of individual responsibility. By holding people responsible for their choices and conduct in the sense that people will be made to bear some of the costs that their conduct causes that fall on other people and on themselves,
we bring it about that over the long run more moral value is achieved than if we refrained from enforcing some such norm of responsibility.
But quite aside from the instrumental value of holding people responsible, I
suppose that bringing it about that a benefit of a given size goes to someone who is badly off through no fault or choice of her own is intrinsically morally better than bringing it about that a same-sized benefit accrues to someone who is equally badly off but has brought about her own unfortunate condition by her own fault or choice. By the same token, if someone is well off by sheer luck, and another is well off by dint of morally commendable effort on behalf of worthy goals, it is intrinsically morally better to secure a gain or avoid a loss for the second person than the first if we must choose between them.
Even if one agrees with these last claims, the question arises how much moral value responsibility contributes to outcomes apart from its instrumental uses. Also, one might wonder whether the intrinsic importance of responsibility, whatever it should turn out to be, has much by way of implications for practical policy, given the futility of trying to devise governmental policies that would vary treatment of individuals with their lifetime responsibility levels. I have optimistic hunches that we can gauge the importance of responsibility and that it will not turn out to be irrelevant to practical policy guidance, but I do not claim to have done anything in this essay to substantiate these hunches.
XII. YACHTS, "HI-FI," AND RUGS FROM THE ORIENT Against Walzer's moderate and sane-sounding view, I have claimed that it might well matter from the standpoint of distributive justice that the quality of one person's recreational boats, music playing equipment, and rugs is superior to another's. Some individuals have more and better than others. Such an inequality might be morally significant, and this might be so even if it is conceded that all people have "enough" according to the sufficiency doctrine.
Eliminating some inequality might improve the well-being of the worse off, even at some cost to the better off, so that weighted well-being rises. If so, and if the policy that promotes equality does not dampen incentives so as to lessen weighted-well-being in the long run, then other things being equal, prioritarian justice favors the elimination of the inequality.
21
The correct account of how one person comes to have more and better than another might indicate that sheer unchosen luck rather than the moral quality of people's choices creates the discrepancy. If this happens to be so, then considerations of responsibility do not block the presumption in favor of egalitarian transfer that is established if it is the case that the transfer would boost weighted well-being over the long run.
Being worse off than another does not matter morally in and of itself, but being well off or badly off matters, and if the urgency of a person's moral claim to our aid is stronger, the worse off the person is, then it will turn out that being worse off than another will put one ahead in the justice queue. One's comparative position is the shadow of what really matters.
